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Market Power and Reputational Concerns in the
Ratings Industry
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University Carlos III of Madrid
Abstract
This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information
that they obtain about their client firms. In the model, rating agencies seek to
maximize their reputation and protect their market power. They observe public
information and obtain either precise or noisy private information about a firm.
Reputational concerns dictate that a rating reflects private information when
it is precise. However, when private information is noisy, two situations arise.
In a monopoly, the rating agency may ignore private information and issue a
rating that conforms to public information. Under some conditions, it may even
become cautious and issue bad ratings ignoring both types of information. With
competition, however, it has incentives to contradict public information as a way
to pretend that it holds precise private information. Moreover, it may become
more likely to issue good ratings in an attempt to protect market power.
∗I thank an anonymous referee, Max Bruche, Gabriella Chiesa, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Francesco Sangiorgi, Hyun
Shin, Isabel Tkatch, Lucy White, participants at the CRENoS Workshop on “Financial markets imperfections, corporate
governance and economic outcomes”, the 2008 PFN meetings, the 2006 EFA meetings, the 2005 ESWC, EEA and Foro
de Finanzas meetings, and seminar participants at VU University Amsterdam, CEMFI, Pompeu Fabra, Instituto de
Empresa, Carlos III and CEMPRE (Porto) for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Portuguese
Ministry of Science and Education and Comunidad de Madrid is gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of this paper
was circulated under the title “Do Reputational Concerns Lead to Reliable Ratings?”; Email: bmariano@emp.uc3m.es.
1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692254
1. Introduction
Rating agencies have received much attention in the debate on the 2007-2009 financial
crisis. The fact that rating agencies are paid by the firms they rate generates conflicts
of interest that can lead to inaccurate ratings. A standard argument is that if rating
agencies were not exposed to these conflicts of interest, incentives to safeguard their
reputation would make them worry enough about providing reliable information to in-
vestors, and hence would ensure accurate ratings. However, this paper shows that a
rating agency that worries about reputation might not have incentives to provide accu-
rate ratings even in the absence of conflicts of interest. This suggests that solving the
problem of conflicts of interest, while certainly very important, might not be sufficient
to secure the best possible ratings.
The reason why reputation should be very important for rating agencies is because
it confers credibility to their announcements, and consequently, makes firms hire their
services. This should be a strong motive for rating agencies to want to provide ac-
curate ratings. To achieve this objective rating agencies should consider all available
information when assigning a rating. However, they can make mistakes, either because
their credit models and rating methodologies might contain errors, the information they
have is incomplete or inaccurate, or they do not fully understand the securities for which
they are providing a rating.1 In order not to damage their reputation and ultimately
their profits, rating agencies do not want to be seen to make mistakes and worry about
giving the appearance of competence. This paper shows that, as a result, they can
simply ignore or contradict some available information when assigning a rating. Conse-
1Both S&P and Moody’s disclosed that they detected errors in their computer models. In the case
of Moody’s, this led them to assign top-notch triple A ratings to products whose ratings, in some
cases, should have been up to four notches lower. See for example, “Moody’s error gave top ratings to
debt products”, Financial Times, May 20 2008, “Moody’s launches review in wake of errors”, Financial
Times, May 21 2008, and “S&P discloses errors in rating models”, Financial Times, June 13 2008.
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quently, reputational concerns can lead to ratings that are not as accurate and reliable
as possible.2 These results hold even though the model abstracts from bribes, conflicts
of interest and repeated relationships between rating agencies and their client firms.
They are particularly relevant for regulators, who are always looking for different ways
to assess the work of rating agencies.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it is to examine the incentives of rating agen-
cies to reveal the information that they obtain while assessing their client firms. These
incentives depend on the effect that revealing this information has on the reputation of
rating agencies, in particular if they can make mistakes in their assessments. Second, it
is to explore in what way competition and market power in the ratings industry affects
the incentives of rating agencies to reveal their information. To develop an intuition
about the effect of competition, I first discuss the case of a monopolistic rating agency
which I use as a benchmark model. In reality, there is some degree of competition
in the ratings industry but the results derived for the monopolistic case allow me to
highlight how competition affects which information is incorporated in ratings as well
as overall rating levels. For example, I can use those results to identify and explain the
circumstances in which good ratings become more likely with competition - a situation
often associated with ratings inflation.
In this paper, I take into account that a rating determines to a large extent the
success of the firm (or project) that receives it. In this sense, a bad rating has far more
consequences than a good one. First, a bad rating increases financing costs which can
2The following quote illustrates this point: “Another rating agency reported to the Staff that one
of its foreign ratings surveillance committees had knowledge that the rating agency had issued ratings
on almost a dozen securities using a model that contained an error. (...) Nonetheless, the committee
agreed to continue to maintain the ratings for several months, until the securities were downgraded
for other reasons. Members of the committee (...) considered the rating agency’s reputational interest
in not making its error public, according to the rating agency.” Source: United Stated Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2008, “Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies”.
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damage the firm.3 Second, a bad rating might deter prospective investors from investing
in the firm, which may restrict its sources of funds available to spend in value-creating
projects. This can be because the regulatory regime requires or encourages broker-
dealers, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutional investors,
which are among the major participants in fixed income security markets, to buy secu-
rities that are rated investment grade (i.e., receive a good rating in the terminology of
the paper).4 The model captures this situation and shows how this asymmetry between
good and bad ratings affects rating agencies decisions.
Suppose there is a project which requires a rating. Both project and rating can be
good or bad. A rating agency issues the rating based on two sources of information:
public information, that expresses prior expectations about the project, and private
information that is assembled by the rating agency’s analysts or provided by the firm.
Private information is either precise or noisy which means that a rating agency can be
of two types: it perfectly identifies the project’s type or it can make mistakes. The
economy is unsure about the rating agency’s type but attaches a subjective probability
to a rating agency not making mistakes. I refer to this probability as the rating agency’s
reputation. The rating agency knows its own type and wants to maximize reputation.
Consider the situation in which public information is strongly in favor of either a
good or bad rating. A rating agency with noisy private information that finds itself
in a situation in which public and private information diverge, might just conform to
public information issuing the rating that everyone expects because of fears of being
seen to make mistakes. However, the asymmetry between a good and bad rating dis-
3Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) and Kliger and Sarig (2000) provide empirical evidence of
the link between ratings and the cost of capital of borrowing firms. The former document a significant
negative effect in stock and bond returns for downgrades, and a weaker effect for upgrades. The latter
find that bond prices react positively (negatively) to better (worse) than expected ratings using a
Moody’s refinement of its rating system. Firms take this link seriously to the extent that it influences
capital structure decisions as shown by Kisgen (2006, 2007).
4White (2002), BIS (2000), Cantor and Packer (1995) and Partnoy (1999) list some of these regu-
latory requirements.
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cussed above generates a bias towards bad ratings, which is most evident when public
information is weakly in favor of a good rating. In this case, the rating agency might
simply ignore all information and issue a bad rating. The argument is as follows. A
good project succeeds if the rating is good but might fail if the rating is bad, whereas a
bad project always fails. Only failures and successes are observable. Hence, the rating
agency might want to be cautious and issue a bad rating, which is more likely to gen-
erate a failure, and therefore less likely to lead to a mistake that is easy to ascertain.
This happens because a monopolistic rating agency does not feel compelled to show
how good its private information really is.
In a situation in which an incumbent rating agency faces a pool of potential com-
petitors ready to enter the industry it needs to show (or to pretend) that it is of the
type that does not make mistakes, to avoid being replaced by a competitor. In this
case, a rating agency with noisy private information becomes aggressive and chooses
to contradict public information more often than in a monopoly. If the rating agency
contradicts public information and the rating turns out to be correct, the market is
more likely to assume that it is because private information is precise and the rating
agency’s reputation increases. The consequence is that ratings become less accurate.
For the reasons mentioned above, it is important that the project receives a good
rating. Therefore, a new rating agency may be asked to enter the industry and issue a
second rating if the incumbent rating agency issues a bad first rating. This gives the
new rating agency the chance to build up reputation if the rating it issues turns out
to be correct and, as a result, it can threaten the status quo of the incumbent. An
incumbent with noisy private information can avert this by issuing a good rating. This
means that reputational concerns can induce ratings inflation in a competitive setting.
Finally, herding on the first rating by the new rating agency depends on the reputation
level of the incumbent rating agency and on the strength of public information.
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Rating agencies can be conformist, cautious, or aggressive even when they worry
about reputation. For example, in the years preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis
rating agencies assigned the highest rating grades to many new and hard-to-value se-
curities such as mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. Even
though nobody fully understood how these securities worked, there was generally little
concern about their quality and many investors even regarded them as conservative
and low-risk investments.5 Hence, rating agencies had strong reputational incentives
to simply issue high ratings. Investors would see their expectations fulfilled and be
able and prepared to buy these securities; rating agencies would appear competent and
capable of understanding the securities they had been hired to rate.6
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on information revelation and competition
for financial intermediaries by addressing the importance of reputation for rating agen-
cies. This is relevant because of the unique features of rating agencies relative to other
financial intermediaries that have been examined in the literature, such as investment
banks or financial analysts. While the first papers in this literature consider intermedi-
aries that cannot establish a reputation (e.g. Biglaiser, 1993, and Lizzeri, 1999), more
recent ones handle this topic in different ways. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007, 2010)
address the conflicts of interest faced by financial intermediaries that provide advice to
investors (rating agencies in Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2010) when they incur a fixed
reputational cost every time their advice is misleading or confusing. Damiano, Li and
Suen (2008) also consider an exogenous reputational cost and how it affects the credi-
bility of ratings. This paper does not tackle conflicts of interest issues and deals with
reputation endogenously using Bayesian updating. In this way it is easier to derive the
5Manson and Rosner (2007) discuss the difficulties in assessing the risk of such securities.
6This story echoes what happened with the Enron case in which rating agencies also had to deal
with complex energy derivatives and which lead to equally inflated ratings.
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value of reputation in different scenarios and to link it to the information structure of
the model.
A closely related paper with endogenous reputation is Mathis, McAndrews and
Rochet (2009) which assesses how it can act as disciplining device for rating agencies in
an infinite period model based on the cheap talk literature (e.g., Crawford and Sobel,
1982, Sobel, 1985, Benabou and Laroque, 1992, Morris, 2001). The authors characterize
the sufficient conditions in a truthtelling equilibrium but tie the results to the existence
of conflicts of interest. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2010) build up on this paper to model
the problem of a rating agency that chooses in each period how much to invest in
reputation for accurate ratings by hiring better analysts. They conclude, as in the
model below, that reputation is not enough to ensure accurate ratings and link changes
in its importance to the business cycle: a rating agency builds up reputation in booms to
milk it in recessions. Bouvard and Levy (2010) develop a model in which (endogenous)
reputation is used by a rating agency to attract both firms and potential investors.
While this dampens the importance of conflicts of interest, ratings manipulation still
occurs in such model. In their case, it results from low effort choices in information
production activities when a rating agency with a good reputation vis-a`-vis investors
wants to dissipate its reputation in order to attract business from firms. Manipulation
of information also arises in Durbin and Iyer (2009) due to an advisor’s concerns for
appearing incorruptible. They discuss how to use bribes to restore truthful information
transmission.7
Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) present an-
other mechanism to generate biased (or inflated) ratings. They use ratings shopping
in models in which rating agencies always reveal information truthfully. In Skreta and
Veldkamp (2009) the problem is worse for ratings of complex assets, i.e. assets whose
7On a related topic, Stolper (2009) focuses on the role of regulation to induce rating agencies to
assign correct ratings.
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payoffs are more uncertain.8 Even though I do not directly model uncertainty in the
model below, one can think of a situation in which public information is less informative
about the rating, i.e. if it is weakly in favor of either a good or bad rating, as one in
which “uncertainty” is greater. In such situation, ratings are less biased towards public
information and are more likely to reflect the private signal. Interestingly, this contrasts
to Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) intuition.
This paper also borrows from Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a, 2006b, 2006c). They
study the impact of career and reputational concerns on the reports of analysts and
derive that they tend to conform to the prior belief, except in competition, when their
reports are excessively differentiated due to private information. While these papers
share some important features with mine, there are some crucial differences. In the
model below, a rating agency always knows the quality of its private signal and, in
order to resemble rating scales and emphasize the difference between investment and
non-investment grade securities, the private signal and the rating are assumed to be
binary rather then continuously distributed. Moreover, allowing for an asymmetry
between a good and bad rating makes it possible to explore effects which are not in
Ottaviani and Sorensen’s papers. The possibility of conformism is also present in Prat
(2005). In a career concerns model, increased disclosure about an agent’s actions leads
to conformism by which the agent ignores the private signal and mimics the behavior of
an “able” agent. This produces worse outcomes in terms of information revelation and
makes it harder to evaluate the agent’s ability. This also happens in the model presented
below precisely when there is less “uncertainty” about the rating, i.e. when the public
prior becomes more informative (either in favor of a good or bad rating). In a related
paper, Bar-Isaac (2011) endogenizes the quality of the private signal. He considers a
situation in which an agent can exert effort to improve the quality of a signal about the
8In Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009) this happens when the heterogeneity among the valuations
of different rating agencies is greatest.
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outcome of a project. An agent has stronger incentives to generate information when
there is more uncertainty about the outcome and this information can help him decide
on the best course of action. This kind of mechanism could exacerbate incentives to
conform as present in my model: The rating agency’s incentives to exert effort would
be dampened precisely when the public prior is more informative about the rating and
therefore, when better private information is less useful ex-ante.
This paper is also related to the broader literature on herding on the actions or fore-
casts of others (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Trueman, 1994, Avery and Chevalier,
1999, Graham, 1999, Effinger and Polborn, 2001, for applied theory work; Welch, 2000,
or Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000, for empirical work), and on the literature on the
importance of reputation for underwriters (e.g., Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).
On the empirical side, there is an increasing number of papers that look at rating
agencies (e.g., Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009a, 2009b, Ashcraft, Goldsmith and Vick-
ery, 2009, Rajan, Seru and Vig, 2010). Many investigate the extent of rating agencies’
contribution to the subprime crisis, but fail to identify a single reason behind ratings
agencies’ mistakes. This suggests that ratings-shopping, conflicts of interest and rep-
utational concerns might all have played an important part in the decisions of rating
agencies in the years preceding the crisis. Finally, there is also empirical evidence on
how competition affects the informational content and accuracy of ratings. Doherty,
Kartasheva, and Phillips (2009) analyze the optimal disclosure policy of rating agencies
for different industry structures focusing on what differences in rating scales mean in
terms of credit risk of firms. Cantor and Packer (1997) also look at the issue of dif-
ferences in rating scales. Becker and Milbourn (2010) use Fitch’s market share as a
measure of competition faced by other rating agencies and find that competition leads
to more issuer-friendly ratings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the basic char-
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acteristics of the monopolistic model and section 3 contains the equilibrium analysis
and comparative statics. Section 4 develops a more realistic scenario in which there is
competition in the ratings industry and section 5 concludes.
2. The Benchmark Model: A Monopoly
In this economy there is a risk-neutral rating agency and time is divided in two dates:
date 0 and date 1.9
2.1. The Project and Public Information
At date 0 there is an idea for a project which yields an operational cash-flow at date
1 that is positive if the project is good (G) or negative if the project is bad (B). The
type of project is not known ex-ante but general conditions of the economy determine
a common prior belief over it. Specifically, a project is good with probability θ and bad
with probability 1− θ, with θ ∈ (0, 1). This probability summarizes public information
about the type of project. The institutional and legal regime establishes that a rating
agency uses its technology to evaluate the project and generate a rating which is always
made public.10 The rating determines the cost of financing the project.
2.2. The Objective of the Rating Agency and Private Information
The rating agency chooses which rating to issue at date 0 so as to maximize reputation
at date 1.11 During this process, it obtains private information about the project which
9Rating agencies operate for longer periods but assuming two dates makes the analysis more
tractable while still capturing the importance of reputation. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2010) follow
a similar simplifying assumption.
10In Ma¨hlmann (2008) a firm has discretion over the disclosure of credit ratings.
11In the version of the paper that circulated under the title “Do Reputational Concerns Lead to
Reliable Ratings?” I solve for the problem of a rating agency that wants to maximize fees. I show
that these fees increase with reputation. Because the algebra is quite complicated I present here a
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takes the form of a private signal that can be of two types: sG indicates that the
project is good and sB indicates that the project is bad. The quality of the private
signal depends on the rating agency’s ability, represented by a, which can be high (H)
or low (L). An H rating agency obtains a precise private signal that reveals the type
of project, while an L rating agency obtains a noisy private signal. The rating agency
knows its own type but everyone else attaches a probability to the type of rating agency.
The probability α0 represents the subjective belief that a rating agency is of type H
at date 0, with α0 ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
, and α1 is the updated belief at date 1. I refer to these
probabilities as the rating agency’s reputation.12 An H rating agency always identifies
the type of project which means that:
Pr (sG | G,H) = Pr (sB | B,H) = 1,
and
Pr (sG | B,H) = Pr (sB | G,H) = 0. (1)
An L rating agency makes mistakes half of the times which means that:13
Pr (sG | G,L) = Pr (sB | B,L) =
1
2
and
Pr (sG | B,L) = Pr (sB | G,L) =
1
2
. (2)
simplified version whose qualitative results remain the same. Details are available on request.
12The fact that α0 ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
does not affect the results which can be generalized for any value of
α0 ∈ (0, 1). This assumption is only used to allow for an easier comparison with the results derived in
Section 4.
13In Appendix A.1.2. I argue that the qualitative results of the model hold for a more general
information structure.
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There are two types of ratings: a good rating rG and a bad rating rB. A bad rating can
be interpreted as a non-investment grade rating and a good rating can be interpreted as
an investment grade rating. When deciding on the rating, the rating agency considers
both the prior belief θ and the private signal, which it can choose to follow or contradict
with the rating that it ultimately issues. In equilibrium, a rating agency with ability
a issues a rating that contradicts the private signal with probabilities Pr(rG | sB, θ, a)
and Pr(rB | sG, θ, a), respectively.
2.3. Success of a Project and Ratings
A rating is required to raise financing for the project. The operational cash-flow of the
project, which is independent of the rating, is used to pay for the financing costs. A
good rating decreases financing costs, while a bad rating increases them. As a result,
when the rating is bad, even the operational cash-flow generated by a good project
might be insufficient to cover for the financing costs and, as a consequence, the project
is perceived as a failure.14 This happens with probability β, i.e. β is the probability
that a good project fails following a bad rating. The operational cash-flow generated
by the bad project is negative which means that financing costs are never covered for
and the project is equally perceived as a failure. The fact that a project succeeds (S) or
fails (F) is observable, however, a good project that fails is indistinguishable from a bad
project. Therefore, β gives the extent at which the type of project is verifiable following
a bad rating. It is never verifiable if β = 1, and it is always verifiable if β = 0.15
I use this formulation to capture the importance of a good rating to a firm and the
14Manso (2011) presents a model in which ratings have a similar effect which he denotes as “feedback
effect”: a rating is “self-fulfilling” as it determines the interest rate which affects the probability of
survival of the borrower which, in turn, influences its credit quality. In an earlier paper, Boot, Milbourn
and Schmeits (2006) also consider a model in which ratings have a real impact on firms’ choices and
on outcomes.
15In Appendix C I also discuss what happens when a bad project succeeds following a good rating
with probability β.
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fact that, in reality, what matters to investors is whether they get their money back
rather than the intrinsic quality of a project. It also captures an important feature of
financial regulation. The manager of a firm whose debt has received a bad rating (non-
investment grade) has a much harder time persuading investors to participate in the
project and some investors might even be unable to do so due to regulatory constraints.
In this sense, if β = 1 a good project always fails following a bad rating because either
financing costs are too high or financing funds are unavailable and the project is not
even undertaken. In the analysis that follows I explore two cases: β > 0 (for which
there is an asymmetry between a good and bad rating) and β = 0 (for which there is
symmetry between a good and bad rating). I highlight which results hold in each case.
2.4. Posterior Beliefs
The outcome of the project is publicly observable at date 1. At this point, the belief
about the type of rating agency is updated by comparing this outcome to the rating.
This posterior belief, which is generally represented by α1, is equal to one of the following
probabilities: α1 (rG, S), α1 (rB, F ), α1 (rG, F ) or α1 (rB, S). In particular, α1 (rG, S)
(α1 (rG, F )) represents the posterior belief that the rating agency is of type H given that
it assigns a good rating to a project that succeeds (fails); and α1 (rB, F ) (α1 (rB, S))
represents the posterior belief that the rating agency is of type H given that it assigns a
bad rating to a project that fails (succeeds). For a combination (rating, outcome) equal
to (rG, S) it is obvious that the rating agency correctly identified a good project, and for
(rG, F ) and (rB, S) that it incorrectly identified a bad and good project, respectively.
However, in the case of (rB, F ) and βǫ (0, 1] it is not possible to know if the rating
agency correctly identified a bad project or incorrectly identified a good project which
failed due to the rating.
Table 1 summarizes the notation. Some of these notation is introduced in the next
13
Table 1.: Summary of notation
θ Prior probability of a G project, θ ∈ (0, 1)
sG, sB Good and bad private signal
rG, rB Good and bad rating
a Rating agency’s ability, a={H,L}
α0, α1 Probability of an H rating agency at dates 0 and 1 (represents reputation)
β Probability that a G project fails following rB
α1 (rG, S) (α1 (rG, F )) Probability of an H rating agency when rG is assigned to a project that succeeds (fails)
α1 (rB , S) (α1 (rB , F )) Probability of an H rating agency when rB is assigned to a project that succeeds (fails)
γ Probability of an L rating agency contradicting a bad private signal
γ Probability of an L rating agency contradicting a good private signal
section.
3. Equilibrium Analysis for the Monopoly Bench-
mark
This section characterizes the equilibrium in which a rating agency is rewarded for
correct ratings and punished otherwise. In this sense, it consists of the optimal choices
by the rating agency of contradicting the private signal at date 0 so as to maximize
reputation at date 1.
At date 0, the rating agency obtains the private signal and chooses which rating
to issue. If a rating agency with ability a and a good private signal issues the private
signal as a rating it achieves α1 (rG, S) at date 1 if the project succeeds, and α1 (rG, F )
otherwise. Its expected reputation is equal to:
Pr (S | sG, a)α1 (rG, S) + Pr (F | sG, a)α1 (rG, F )
where Pr (S | sG, a) = Pr (G | sG, a) and Pr (F | sG, a) = Pr (B | sG, a).
16 If the rating
16These probabilities also depend on the prior belief θ. This is ignored for simplicity, as far as
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agency does not issue the private signal as a rating its expected reputation is equal to:
Pr (S | sG, a)α1 (rB, S) + Pr (F | sG, a)α1 (rB, F )
where Pr (S | sG, a) = (1− β) .Pr (G | sG, a) and Pr (F | sG, a) = β.Pr (G | sG, a) +
Pr (B | sG, a). The rating agency issues the rating that generates the highest expected
reputation. That is to say that in equilibrium, the sign of:
Pr (S | sG, a)α1 (rG, S) + Pr (F | sG, a)α1 (rG, F )−
(Pr (S | sG, a)α1 (rB, S) + Pr (F | sG, a)α1 (rB, F )) , (3)
is positive (negative) when the rating agency follows (contradicts) the private signal and
it is equal to zero when the rating agency is indifferent. In this case the equilibrium is
in mixed strategies.
Likewise for the case of a bad private signal. In equilibrium, the sign of:
Pr (S | sB, a)α1 (rG, S) + Pr (F | sB, a)α1 (rG, F )−
(Pr (S | sB, a)α1 (rB, S) + Pr (F | sB, a)α1 (rB, F )) , (4)
is negative (positive) when the rating agency follows (contradicts) the private signal
and it is equal to zero when the rating agency is indifferent. The equilibrium proba-
bilities that an L rating agency contradicts the private signal, i.e. Pr(rG | sB, θ, L) and
Pr(rB | sG, θ, L), are denoted by γ and γ respectively. The results are summarized in
Proposition 1 whose complete proof is relegated to Appendix A. Figure 1 represents
some of the results graphically.
Proposition 1. An H rating agency always issues the private signal as a rating. For
notation is concerned.
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the L rating agency there are θ and θ, with θ < θ, such that: when θ ∈
[
θ, 1
)
it
always issues a good rating and when θ ∈ (0, θ] it always issues a bad rating. When
θ ∈
(
θ, θ
)
, the rating agency behaves as follows: when the private signal is bad it issues
a good rating with probability 0 < γ < 1 and a bad rating otherwise; and when the
private signal is good it issues a bad rating with probability 0 < γ < 1 and a good
rating otherwise. The difference between the equilibrium values of γ and γ is given by
γ¯ − γ = 2θ − 1− α0
1−α0
2(1−θ)(1−2θ+θβ)
1−θ+θβ
. If α0 >
1+β
1+2β
, the threshold θ exceeds 1
2
.
Region (a) Region (b)
0 1/2 θ θ¯ 1
Figure 1.: Equilibrium behavior of the L rating agency as a function of θ when α0 >
1+β
1+2β
.
Region (a): The rating agency always issues rB . Between θ and θ¯: When the private signal
is sG it issues rB with probability γ and rG otherwise; when the private signal is sB it issues
rG with probability γ and rB otherwise. Region (b): The rating agency always issues rG.
The starting point to prove Proposition 1 is to show that there cannot be an equilibrium
in which an H rating agency contradicts the private signal. In addition, since a rating
agency wants to maximize reputation, an L rating agency has incentives to mimic the
behavior of an H rating agency. The rest of the proof follows easily from here.
The proposition states that when public information is strongly in favor of a good
(bad) rating and the L rating agency’s private information indicates that the project
is bad (good), there are situations in which it chooses to issue a good (bad) rating. In
this case, the rating agency conforms to the prior belief and ignores private information.
This is because the L rating agency wants to pretend to have received a good (bad)
private signal as this would have been very likely ex-ante, had it been of type H. This
result is independent of the value of β. However, when 1
2
< θ < θ public information is
weakly in favor of a good rating but there are situations in which an L rating agency
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chooses to ignore this even when its private information indicates that the project is
good, and issues a bad rating. In this case, the rating agency is cautious and ignores all
information. This happens when α0 >
1+β
1+2β
and β > 0. If an L rating agency chooses
to issue a good rating and this rating is correct, the rating agency manages to boost
reputation. But if such rating is incorrect and the project fails, the rating agency’s
type is revealed. So the rating agency tries to hide its true type behind a bad rating
which can also be shown to be incorrect (if the project succeeds) but which is more
likely to generate a project that indeed fails because β > 0. In this way, the rating
agency reputation is more likely to remain reasonably unscathed. This is particularly
important first, when the reputation level at date 0, α0, is high because this is when
the opportunity cost of a mistake is higher; and second, when the probability β that a
good project fails following a bad rating is high because this is when hiding the type
behind a bad rating is more effective.
Comparative statics results are summarized in Proposition 2. The proof is in Ap-
pendix A.1.4.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, γ − γ is: 1) increasing in the value of the prior belief
θ; 2) decreasing in the probability that a good project fails following a bad rating, β; 3)
decreasing in the reputation level at date 0, α0, if θ <
1
2−β
and increasing otherwise.
Point 1 states that more positive public information results in a higher (lower) proba-
bility of contradicting a bad (good) private signal. Point 2 specifies that as the outcome
of the project becomes less likely to be verifiable following a bad rating, an L rating
agency becomes less (more) likely to contradict a bad (good) private signal. Finally,
point 3 indicates that as the reputation level at date 0, α0, increases, an L rating agency
becomes less (more) likely to contradict a bad (good) private signal when θ < 1
2−β
, i.e.
when public information is in favor of a bad rating.17 An increase in the reputation
17And even in favor of a good rating if β > 0 because 12−β >
1
2 when β 6= 0.
17
level at date 0, α0, increases the reputation level at date 1, α1, regardless of the rating
provided that it is correct.18 If the rating is incorrect, reputation becomes zero because
the rating agency is revealed as an L type. Hence, an increase in the reputation level
at date 0, α0, increases the reputational cost that a rating agency faces from issuing an
incorrect rating and, as a consequence, the rating agency has more incentives to gamble
on the rating that is ex-ante more likely to be correct. When the prior belief θ is low
enough and/or the probability that a good project fails following a bad rating, β, is
high enough, it is indeed the case that a bad rating is ex-ante more likely to be correct
than a good rating, or at least less likely to be inconsistent with the outcome of the
project. The opposite happens when θ > 1
2−β
.
4. Competition
To make the model more realistic, and to highlight further effects, I introduce some
degree of competition in the ratings industry. At present, competition is limited to the
existence of a relatively small number of rating agencies and the advantages of increasing
competition in the sector remain unclear. For this reason, it is important to explore
how it affects information revelation when rating agencies worry about reputation.
Competition is modeled as follows. Consider the framework presented in section 2
and assume that the monopolistic rating agency, which is the incumbent rating agency
and is henceforth denoted by i, faces competition from a group of identical rating
agencies. Each rating agency that belongs to this group aims to enter the industry and
is denoted by j. The private signal of a rating agency j is as described in Section 2.2.
but its reputation level at date 0 is given by α0j =
1
2
; this is a new rating agency for
which there is no information, hence the prior about its true type is uninformative. The
18This is straightforward from expressions (12)-(13).
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subscripts j and j’ are used to denote two rating agencies of this group whenever it is
required to distinguish between them. Table 2 revises the notation.
The objective of rating agency i is to maximize reputation relative to the competi-
tors. The idea is that being the most reputable in a pool of rating agencies confers
market power to a rating agency, which increases with the reputation gap relative to
the others in the pool. The objective of each rating agency j is to enter the industry and
build up reputation to differentiate itself from the other rating agencies in the group.
Two distinct cases are considered. In the first case, denoted as single rating case,
rating agency i is very well established in the industry which makes a rating issued by
j worthless. In this case, rating agency i acts to maintain its market power and rating
agencies j wait for an opportunity to enter the industry. This happens when rating
agency i makes a mistake or its reputation level falls below that of the j -types. In the
second case, denoted as sequential ratings case, one randomly selected rating agency j
is given the opportunity to issue a second rating if rating agency i issues a bad first
rating. It is reasonable to assume that the second rating has no effect on the proba-
bility of success of the project. This is because rating agency j is a newcomer which
still needs to build up reputation, and therefore, whose rating should have little or no
impact on financing costs. However, a good (even if second) rating might be valuable to
attract a wider group of investors who would be unable to participate otherwise due to
the regulatory constraints explained in Section 2.3. Empirical evidence by Bongaerts,
Cremers and Goetzmann (2010) supports this story. They test three reasons for why al-
ready rated firms ask for an additional rating: information production, rating shopping
and certification with respect to regulatory and rules-based constraints. Their evidence
supports certification only. The additional rating matters for regulatory purposes and
does not seem to provide significant information related to credit spreads.19
19The probability of success of a project remains as in Section 2.3 but the results derived below hold
even if the second rating affects this probability moderately. For more details see footnote (32).
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Table 2.: Revised notation for rating agency i
siG, siB Good and bad private signal
riG, riB Good and bad rating
α1i (riG, S) (α1i (riG, F )) Probability of an H rating agency when it assigns rG to a project that succeeds (fails)
α1i (riB , S) (α1i (riB , F )) Probability of an H rating agency when it assigns rB to a project that succeeds (fails)
γi Probability of an L rating agency contradicting a bad private signal
γi Probability of an L rating agency contradicting a good private signal
γsi Probability of an L rating agency contradicting a bad private signal with sequential ratings
γsi Probability of an L rating agency contradicting a good private signal with sequential ratings
4.1. Equilibrium Analysis: Single Rating Case
Rating agency i chooses which rating to issue at date 0 so as to maximize its mar-
ket power defined as the difference between its reputation level at date 1 and that of
competitors, α1i (., .) − α0j. If α0j = 0 there is a monopoly and if α0j = α1i (., .) the
rating agencies are identical and competition is maximized, in the sense that profits
are minimized. If α1i (., .) < α0j =
1
2
, rating agency i is the “worst” in the industry
and is replaced by a rating agency j randomly selected out of the pool.20 Intuitively,
this formulation captures how the reputation of a rating agency increases the value of
its ratings. One could think that, in a model in which rating agencies compete in fees
(Bertrand competition), higher reputation relative to a competitor allows the rating
agency to charge higher fees.21
The idea now is to examine how the results in Proposition 1 change with competition.
It is shown in Appendix B.1. that the behavior of an H rating agency remains the same
meaning that it always follows the private signal. Consequently, if rating agency i
makes a mistake it is revealed as an L type and α1i (riB, S) = α1i (riG, F ) = 0. This
20Note that this is a model in which rating agencies want to maximize reputation and there are no
conflicts of interest or ratings shopping. The most reputable rating agency is also the industry“leader”.
21In a working paper (and considerably longer) version of the paper that circulated under the title
“Do Reputational Concerns Lead to Reliable Ratings?” I consider a duopoly with different reputation
levels. The fees are derived endogenously and shown to increase with the reputation gap between the
two rating agencies. The qualitative results are therefore as derived here.
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is when it is replaced by a competitor j. Hence, for an L rating agency with a good
private signal expression (3) becomes
Pr (S | siG, L) (α1i (riG, S)− α0j)− ΞPr (F | siG, L) (α1i (riB, F )− α0j) (5)
and for an L rating agency with a bad private signal expression (4) becomes
Pr (S | siB, L) (α1i (riG, S)− α0j)− ΞPr (F | siB, L) (α1i (riB, F )− α0j) , (6)
where Ξ = 1 if α1i (riB, F ) > α0j and Ξ = 0 otherwise.
22 The choices of the rating
agency are summarized in Proposition 3 which is proven in Appendix B.1.
Proposition 3. An H rating agency i always issues the private signal as a rating. An
L rating agency i issues good ratings more often than in a monopoly when θ < 1
2−β
and
less often when θ > 1
2−β
.
Note that the penalty for a mistake is as in a monopoly (reputation becomes zero)
whereas the reward for being correct is smaller. Hence, an L rating agency becomes
aggressive and contradicts the prior belief more often than in an monopoly regardless of
the private signal. In doing so, a correct rating prompts larger increases in reputation
given that it is more likely to result from a perfect private signal. This happens even
when β = 0. The comparative statics results for γi1 and γi1 yield similar results to the
monopoly case.
It is interesting to compare this to the behavior of a rating agency that chooses to
issue the most accurate ratings. An H rating agency issues the private signal as a rating.
22There is no indicator function in the first term because, in this case, there is no doubt that the
rating agency correctly identified the project and α1i (riG, S) > α0j . This is straightforward from the
expressions and applies also to a rating agency j.
21
An L rating agency with a good private signal issues a good rating if Pr (G| sG) >
Pr (B| sG), i.e. when θ >
1
2
, and a bad rating otherwise. An L rating agency with a
bad private signal issues a good rating if Pr (G| sB) > Pr (B| sB), i.e. when θ >
1
2
, and
a bad rating otherwise. This is already quite different from what an L monopolist does
according to Proposition 1 and Figure 1. With competition, the accuracy of ratings
deteriorates even further as the L rating agency actually contradicts public information
regardless of the private signal.
When β = 1 an L rating agency always issues good ratings more often than in
monopoly. In this case, a bad rating always causes a failure and it is impossible to
distinguish if the project was indeed bad or if it failed due to the rating. Hence, to be
able to come across as an H rating agency and to increase its reputation relative to the
competitors, an L rating agency gambles on being correct by issuing good ratings.
In the single rating case a rating agency i always competes with a rating agency j
with reputation equal to 1
2
. This is because rating agency j never gets a chance to issue
a rating unless rating agency i makes a mistake and is driven out of the industry. If
rating agency j also issues a rating at date 0, rating agency i needs to consider how j ’s
reputation evolves between dates 0 and 1. This is the sequential ratings case discussed
in the next section.
4.2. Equilibrium Analysis: Sequential Ratings Case
4.2.1. The Problem of Rating Agency j
One randomly selected rating agency j issues a second rating at date 0 following a bad
first rating from rating agency i. The market power of this rating agency j is defined
as the difference between its reputation level at date 1 and that of any rating agency j ’
which remains in the pool, α1j (., .) − α0j′ . An H rating agency (i or j ) always follows
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the private signal (shown in Appendix B.2.1.). Consequently, a bad rating to a project
that succeeds means, as in a monopoly and in the single rating case, that j is an L
rating agency and α1j (rjB, S) = 0 but a good rating to a project that fails no longer
means that α1j (rjG, F ) = 0. This is because a bad first rating could have caused a
good project to fail. Given this, expressions (4) and (3) for an L rating agency become:
Pr (S | sjB, riB,L) (α1j (rjG, S)− αj′0) + ΠGPr (F | sjB, riB, L) (α1j (rjG, F )− αj′0)−
ΠBPr (F | sjB, riB, L) (α1j (rjB, F )− αj′0) (7)
Pr (S | sjG, riB, L) (α1j (rjG, S)− αj′0)+ΠGPr (F | sjG, riB, L) (α1j (rjG, F )− αj′0)−
ΠBPr (F | sjG, riB, L) (α1j (rjB, F )− αj′0) . (8)
where ΠG = 1 if α1j (rjG, F ) > αj′0 and ΠG = 0 otherwise. Likewise for ΠB.
4.2.2. The Problem of Rating Agency i
The market power of rating agency i differs as follows in relation to the single rating
case. Following a bad first rating, rating agency j can either contradict it (and issue
rjG) or agree with it (and issue rjB). When it correctly contradicts the first rating,
rating agency i is revealed as an L type and is out of the industry. When it incorrectly
contradicts the first rating, rating agency i competes with j if α1j (rjG, F ) > αj′0 or with
j’ otherwise. Its market power becomes α1i (riB, F )−max {α1j (rjG, F ) , αj′0}. Likewise
for when rating agency j correctly agrees with the first rating. The market power of
rating agency i becomes α1i (riB, F ) −max {α1j (rjB, F ) , αj′0}. Then, expressions (5)
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and (6) become:
Pr (S | siG, a) (α1i (riG, S)− α0j)− Pr (F | siG, a) [Pr (rjB)ΥB (α1i (riB, F )−
max {α1j (rjB, F ) , αj′0}) + Pr (rjG)ΥG (α1i (riB, F )−max {α1j (rjG, F ) , αj′0})] (9)
Pr (S | siB, a) (α1i (riG, S)− α0j)− Pr (F | siB, a) [Pr (rjB)ΥB (α1i (riB, F )−
max {α1j (rjB, F ) , αj′0}) + Pr (rjG)ΥG (α1i (riB, F )−max {α1j (rjG, F ) , αj′0})] ,
(10)
where ΥB = 1 if α1i (riB, F ) > max {α1j (rjB, F ) , αj′0} and ΥB = 0 otherwise. Likewise
for ΥG. Note that α0j = αj′0. From looking at the previous expressions, it is clear that
the reward for a correct good rating does not change relative to the single rating case,
whereas the reward for a correct (or unverifiable) bad rating is likely to decrease. This
anticipates the equilibrium results which are presented in the next section.
4.2.3. Equilibrium Results
Appendix B.2. derives the results established in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. (1) An H rating agency i (j) always issues the private signal as a
rating. (2) An L rating agency i issues good ratings more often than in the single rating
case. This means that γsi − γ
s
i > γi − γi. (3) An L rating agency j behaves as follows:
when the private signal is bad, it issues a good rating with probability 0 ≤ γj < 1 and
a bad rating otherwise; and when the private signal is good, it issues a bad rating with
probability 0 < γj ≤ 1 and a good rating otherwise.
For rating agency i, this is an extension of the single rating case in which a bad rating
has an extra disadvantage: it gives rating agency j an opportunity to issue a rating and
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start building up reputation if the rating is correct. This can threaten the status quo
of an L rating agency i. Hence, its incentives to issue a good rating in order to deny
the competitor this opportunity increase. This happens even if β = 0.
When given the opportunity to issue a rating, an L rating agency j considers two
effects. On the one hand, contradicting the first rating and issuing a good rating
increases reputation if this rating is correct. Even if incorrect, there is no way to check
whether the project was in fact good but failed due to the bad first rating when β > 0.
On the other hand, a bad first rating provides an additional signal to the rating agency
and increases the probability of failure of a good project when β > 0. Rating agency
j balances these effects and ends up following a mixed strategy in most cases. It can
herd on the first rating and issue a bad rating when the prior belief θ is sufficiently low
(public information is strongly in favor of a bad rating) and/or the reputation level of
rating agency i at date 0, α0, is sufficiently high (the first rating is likely to be correct).
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Corollary 1. Rating agency j can herd on the first rating when the prior belief θ is
sufficiently low and/or the reputation level of rating agency i at date 0, α0, is sufficiently
high.
As far as accuracy of ratings is concerned, it worsens with respect to the monopolistic
case as rating agency i issues good ratings more often, regardless of public and private
information. This is in line with the empirical results by Becker and Milbourn (2010),
which show how an incumbent rating agency reacts to increased competition: ratings
levels go up, the correlation between ratings and yields fall, and the ability of ratings to
predict default deteriorates. This result also suggests that ratings inflation can occur
despite of reputational concerns whenever a rating agency wants to prevent a competitor
23Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008) study how disagreements in ratings are stronger in situations of
higher informational opacity in particular, for young firms. This results are in line with the theoretical
predictions of the corollary. It makes sense to think of the prior belief θ of a young firm as uninformative
and therefore somewhere around 12 . In this case herding is less likely to occur.
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from building up reputation.
Finally, it would be interesting to see how the equilibrium value of γsi − γ
s
i affects
γj − γj when the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The relationship is shown to be
negative and is stated in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. For a given γsi − γ
s
i , rating agency j is less (more) likely to contradict a
bad (good) private signal when rating agency i is more likely to contradict a bad private
signal. A rating agency j is more (less) likely to contradict a bad (good) private signal
when rating agency i is more likely to contradict a good private signal.
Take the situation in which an L rating agency i is very likely to contradict a bad private
signal and consequently, it is ex-ante very likely to issue a good rating. Then, when a
bad rating is issued it is more likely that rating agency i is of type H. Contradicting
this rating is risky hence, an L rating agency j is less (more) likely to contradict a bad
(good) signal and issues a bad rating more often. Take the situation in which an L
rating agency i is very likely to contradict a good private signal and consequently, it is
ex-ante very likely to issue a bad rating. Then, when a bad rating is indeed issued it is
very likely that rating agency i is of type L. Contradicting this rating is relatively safe
hence, an L rating agency j is more (less) likely to contradict a bad (good) signal and
issues a good rating more often.
5. Conclusions
This paper looks at the incentives of rating agencies to reveal information about their
client firms, in a framework in which they use public and private information about
these firms, and aim to maximize reputation. It shows how the quality of the private
information and the structure of the ratings industry shapes the behavior of rating agen-
cies. Precise private information is always incorporated in ratings which improves their
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accuracy. Noisy private information is mostly ignored by a monopolistic rating agency
which tends to conform to public information. However, in a competitive ratings indus-
try in which an incumbent rating agency wants to protect its market power, public and
private information are used to gamble on being correct and increasing reputation. In
such setup, reputational concerns do not guarantee the most accurate ratings possible.
Rating agencies start contradicting public information regardless of private information
because if they are lucky and issue the correct ratings, the market associates this to
precise private information. Competition also forces an incumbent rating agency to
issue good ratings more often than in a monopoly to deny competitors the possibility
to issue a second rating and the chance to build up reputation.
The model clearly illustrates how reputation and a competitive ratings industry
do not ensure accurate ratings if the quality of a rating agency’s private information
is low (noisy) even in the absence of conflicts of interest. However, accurate ratings
are always obtained if the quality of private information is high (precise) regardless of
how the ratings industry is organized. An implication that arises from comparing the
behavior of the two types of rating agency is that an important way to generate more
accurate ratings may be to promote better mechanisms for gathering and processing
information. Related to this topic, the papers by Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2010) and
Bar-Isaac (2011) discussed above show that new problems emerge when the quality of
the private information of an agent becomes a decision variable, which indicates that
this topic provides an interesting avenue for future research.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
This Appendix characterizes the unique equilibrium in which a rating agency is re-
warded for correct ratings and punished otherwise.24 In such equilibrium, the fol-
lowing happens: α1 (rG, S) > α1 (rG, F ) and α1 (rB, F ) > α1 (rB, S). Define τ ∈
{HG, HB, LG, LB} as the set of possible types, where H and L indicate the rating
agency’s type, and G and B indicate the private signal, e.g. HG is an H rating agency
with a good private signal. The set of possible actions is binary: issue a good rating
(rG) or issue a bad rating (rB). The proof is divided in two main steps: first, to show
that in equilibrium an H rating agency must issue the private signal as a rating and
second, to derive the equilibrium behavior of an L rating agency.25
A.1.1. Rating Agency’s Posterior Beliefs about the Type of Project
The rating agency forms the posterior belief about the type of project using the prior
belief θ and expressions (1) or (2). Hence:
Pr (G | sG, H) = 1, Pr (G | sB, H) = 0 and Pr (G | sG, L) = Pr (G | sB, L) = θ. (11)
A.1.2. Auxiliary Lemmas
24Other equilibria may exist but are difficult to interpret in the context of the paper.
25This is as in Boot, Milbourn and Thakor (2005).
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Lemma 1. An H rating agency has less incentives to contradict the private signal than
an L rating agency.
This is the intuition. From expression (11), the H rating agency is always certain about
the type of project, whereas the L rating agency is always unsure. Hence, contradicting
the private signal means a mistake for sure to H and a mistake with a positive probability
to L. As a consequence, H has less incentives to contradict the private signal than L.
Mathematically, one can write expressions (3) and (4) for both types of rating agency,
and use (11) and the fact that α1 (rG, S) > α1 (rB, S) and α1 (rB, F ) > α1 (rG, F ).
For example, if HG is indifferent between issuing rG and rB expression (3) becomes
α1 (rG, S) = (1− β)α1 (rB, S)+βα (rB, F ). In this case, LG has less incentives to issue
rG because θα1 (rG, S)+(1− θ)α1 (rG, F ) < α1 (rG, S), and more incentives to issue rB
because (1− β) θα1 (rB, S)+ (βθ + 1− θ)α1 (rB, F ) > (1− β)α1 (rB, S)+βα1 (rB, F ).
This means that it prefers to issue rB. The same reasoning applies to the case of HB
and LB.
Lemma 2. Whenever an LG (LB) rating agency contradicts the private signal, an
LB (LG) rating agency follows the private signal. Likewise for an H rating agency.
Moreover, whenever an LG (LB) rating agency is indifferent between contradicting and
following the private signal, so is an LB (LG) rating agency.
This essentially means that the L rating agencies make similar rating choices. De-
pending on the private signal, an L rating agency uses expressions (3) or (4) to de-
cide on the rating. Using expression (11), Pr (S | sG, L) = Pr (S | sB, L) = θ and
Pr (F | sG, L) = Pr (F | sB, L) = 1 − θ if the rating is good, and Pr (S | sG, L) =
Pr (S | sB, L) = (1− β) θ and Pr (F | sG, a) = Pr (F | sB, a) = βθ + 1− θ if the rating
is bad. Therefore, expressions (3) and (4) are equal. For the H rating agencies it is also
straightforward to show that if expression (3) is negative (or equal to zero), then (4) is
negative (and if (4) is positive (or equal to zero), then (3) is positive).
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Lemma 3. There cannot be an equilibrium in which an H rating agency contradicts
the private signal.
This is shown by contradiction. Assume that in equilibrium an HG rating agency issues
rB with positive probability. In this case, an L and HB rating agencies issue rB (for
sure) by Lemmas 1 and 2. But then an HG rating agency prefers to issue rG to reveal
its type and maximize reputation. The same reasoning applies if an HB rating agency
issues rG with positive probability. The only equilibrium that arises is derived below.
Note that these Lemmas are likely to hold for a more general information structure:
Lemma 1 only requires that the H rating agency is more certain about the type of
project than the L rating agency; Lemma 2 holds as long as an L rating agency makes
mistakes at most half of the times; Lemma 3 just follows.26 Hence, the main qualitative
results of the model are robust to some changes in the model setup.
A.1.3. Posterior Beliefs about the Rating Agency’s Type
Reputation evolves between dates 0 and 1 according to how the rating compares to the
outcome of the project. By Lemma 2, an LG rating agency contradicts a good private
signal with probability γ and an LB rating agency contradicts a bad private signal with
probability γ. By Lemma 3, an H rating agency follows the private signal. Hence, if the
rating agency issues rB its reputation at date 1 equals one of the following expressions:
α1 (rB, F ) =
α0 (1− θ)
α0 (1− θ) + (1− α0)
1
2
(1− θ + θβ)
(
1− γ + γ
) or α1 (rB, S) = 0.
(12)
Several situations explain (rB, F ): with probability α0 (1− θ) the H rating agency cor-
rectly identifies the project (which is bad with probability 1-θ if it fails), with probability
26In this case Lemma 2 should read: “Whenever an LG (LB) rating agency contradicts the private
signal or is indifferent between contradicting and following the private signal, an LB (LG) rating agency
follows the private signal. Likewise for an H rating agency.”
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(1− α0)
1
2
(1− θ + θβ) (1− γ) the LB rating agency follows the private signal and is ei-
ther correct or incorrect and a good project fails due to the rating, and with probability
(1− α0)
1
2
(1− θ + θβ) γ the LG rating agency contradicts the private signal and is ei-
ther incorrect or correct and a good project fails due to the rating. And if the rating
agency issues rG its reputation at date 1 equals one of the following expressions:
α1 (rG, S) =
α0
α0 + (1− α0)
1
2
(
1− γ + γ
) or α1 (rG, F ) = 0. (13)
Several situations explain (rG, S): with probability α0 the H rating agency correctly
identifies the project (which is good for sure if it succeeds), with probability (1− α0)
1
2
γ
the LB rating agency incorrectly contradicts the private signal, and with probability
(1− α0)
1
2
(
1− γ
)
the LG rating agency correctly follows the private signal.
A.1.4. The Equilibrium Behavior of an L Rating Agency
An L rating agency uses expression (4) (or (3) ) to choose the rating, which using (11),
(12) and (13) looks as follows:
θ
α0
α0 + (1− α0)
1
2
(
1− γ + γ
)−(θβ + 1− θ) α0 (1− θ)
α0 (1− θ) + (1− α0)
1
2
(1− θ + θβ)
(
1− γ + γ
)
(14)
It is straightforward to show that (14) is strictly decreasing in γ − γ and strictly in-
creasing in θ. When θ → 1, the expression is positive which means that issuing rG is
preferable and γ = 1 and γ = 0. This is the equilibrium when θ > 1
1−β+α0
. When
θ → 0, the expression is negative which means that issuing rB is preferable and γ = 0
and γ = 1. When θ = 1
2
, it can be shown that γ = 1 and γ = 0 is not an equilibrium
because the expression is negative. But γ = 0 and γ = 1 can be the equilibrium if
α0 >
1+β
1+2β
. Otherwise, there are two thresholds, θ and θ such that when θ ∈
(
θ, θ
)
the
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equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The difference between the equilibrium values of γ
and γ is given by:
γ − γ = 2θ − 1−
α0
1− α0
2 (1− θ) (1− 2θ + θβ)
1− θ + θβ
.
It is straightforward to show that
d(γ−γ)
dθ
> 027 and
d(γ−γ)
dβ
< 0, but
d(γ−γ)
dα0
= − 2(1−θ)(1−2θ+θβ)
(1−α0)
2(1−θ+θβ)
which is positive if θ > 1
2−β
and negative otherwise.
A.1.5. The Region Between θ and θ
Take θ = θ defined above as the equilibrium value of θ for which γ = 1 and γ = 0 and
expression (14) is positive. And take θ = θ defined above as the equilibrium value of θ
for which γ = 0 and γ = 1 and expression (14) is negative. When substituting the γ’s
and γ’s in the expression, the latter exceeds the former if θ = θ which is impossible.
Given that the expression is increasing in θ this requires that θ < θ. Hence, there is a
region θ ∈
(
θ, θ
)
for which the equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
B. Appendix
B.1. Proof of Proposition 3
The posterior beliefs about the type of project remain the same, hence Lemmas 1-3 still
hold and the posterior beliefs in section A.1.3 remain unchanged with α1i (riG, F ) =
α1i (riB, S) = 0 <
1
2
. Consequently, when Ξ = 1, an L rating agency chooses the rating
27This can also be shown by implicit differentiation of expression (14):
d(γ−γ)
dθ
= −
∂(14)
∂θ
∂(14)
∂(γ−γ)
.
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looking at (6) (or (5)) which becomes:
θ
(
α0
α0 + (1− α0)
1
2
(
1− γi + γi
) − 1
2
)
− (θβ + 1− θ)×
(
α0 (1− θ)
α0 (1− θ) + (1− α0)
1
2
(θβ + (1− θ))
(
1− γi + γi
) − 1
2
)
. (15)
The expression varies with γi−γi and θ as its counterpart in (14). However, expression
(15) differs from (14) by the term 1
2
(θβ + 1− 2θ). If this term is positive the incentives
to issue rG for a given θ increase, and in equilibrium γi−γi > γ−γ. This happens when
θ < 1
2−β
. The opposite happens when θ > 1
2−β
. When β = 1, 1
2
(θβ + 1− 2θ) > 0 and
in equilibrium γi− γi > γ − γ. It can also be shown by implicit differentiation that the
signs of the derivatives of γi − γi with respect to θ and α0 remain unchanged.
Also note that, in equilibrium, α1i (riG, S) >
1
2
(this happens because α0 >
1
2
) and
α1i (riB, F ) >
1
2
, which means that Ξ = 0 never occurs. If α1i (riB, F ) <
1
2
, rating
agency i is replaced by a rating agency j every time it issues riB and the expression
simplifies to θ
(
α0
α0+(1−α0)
1
2
(1−γi+γi)
− 1
2
)
. In this case, γi = 0 and γi = 1 cannot be an
equilibrium because the expression is positive which means that issuing rG is always
preferable. But γi = 1 and γi = 0 cannot be an equilibrium either because when
substituting these values in α1i (riB, F ), it turns out that it always exceeds
1
2
, which is
a contradiction.28
28Intuitively, it means that every time riB is issued it is clear that the rating agency is of type H.
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B.2. Proof of Proposition 4
B.2.1. Rating Agency j: Posterior Beliefs about the Type of Project and
the Rating Agency’s Type
This is the problem of rating agency j taking the values of γsi and γ
s
i as given. Rating
agency j knows that rating agency i behaves according to Lemmas 1-3 because i ’s
posterior beliefs about the type of project remain as in (11). The posterior beliefs about
the type of project for rating agency j are different from those derived in Appendix
A.1.1. and can be written as follows:
Pr (G | sjB, riB, H) = Pr (B | sjG, riB, H) = 0,
P r (B | sjB, riB, H) = Pr (G | sjG, riB, H) = 1,
P r (G | sjB, riB, L) = Pr (G | sjG, riB, L) =
Ψncθ
Ψncθ +Ψc (1− θ)
,
P r (B | sjB, riB, L) = Pr (B | sjG, riB, L) =
Ψc (1− θ)
Ψncθ +Ψc (1− θ)
.
where Ψnc is the probability of rating riB given that the project is good, and Ψc is
the probability of rating riB given that the project is bad, both from the point of view
of an L rating agency j. These probabilities are Ψnc = (1− α0)
1
2
(
1− γsi + γ
s
i
)
and
Ψc = α0+(1− α0)
1
2
(
1− γsi + γ
s
i
)
. Define Φ (riB) =1−γsi +γ
s
i . Given this, it is trivial
to show that Lemmas 1-3 also apply to rating agency j. Lemma 1 still holds because
the signal of an H rating agency remains a better predictor of the project outcome than
the signal of an L rating agency. Lemma 2 still holds because LB and LG choose the
rating to issue based on (7) and (8) which are shown to be equal as in Appendix A.1.2.
Given this, Lemma 3 follows.
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The posterior belief about the rating agency type α1j (rjG, S) is as derived in Ap-
pendix A.1.3. evaluated for α0 =
1
2
, α1j (rjB, F ) =
(1−θ)
(1−θ)+ 1
2
(1−θ+θβΨnc)(1−γj+γj)
and
α1j (rjB, S) = 0.
29 Finally, α1j (rjG, F ) =
Ψncθβ
Ψncθβ+
1
2
(1−θ+Ψncθβ)(1−γj+γj)
which is not equal
to zero as rating agency j can be of type H if a failure is caused by the (first) rating
riB issued to a good project by an L rating agency i.
B.2.2. The Equilibrium Behavior of Rating Agency j
An L rating agency chooses the rating by looking at (7) (or (8)), which for ΠG =
0, ΠB = 1, Pr (S | sjB, riB,a) = (1− β)Pr (G | sjB, riB,a) and Pr (F | sjB, riB,a) =
βPr (G | sjB, riB,a) + Pr (B | sjB, riB,a) become:
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(1− β)Ψncθ

 1
1 + 1
2
(
1− γj + γj
) − 1
2

−
(βΨncθ +Ψc (1− θ))

 (1− θ)
(1− θ) + 1
2
(
1− θ + θβ (1− α0)
1
2
Φ (riB)
) (
1− γj + γj
) − 1
2


(16)
The expression is decreasing in γj − γj and increasing in θ. When θ → 0, it is negative
which means that issuing rB is preferable and γ = 0 and γ = 1. When θ → 1, it is
positive but γj = 1 and γj = 0 cannot be an equilibrium because the expression is
negative for these values of γj. For high levels of θ the possible equilibria are in mixed
strategies. Moreover, there is no equilibrium for which ΠB = 0 because α1j (rjB, F ) >
1
2
.
If α1j (rjB, F ) <
1
2
, the expression is positive which means that issuing rG is always
preferable. However, not only γj = 1 and γj = 0 has already been ruled out as an
equilibrium, but also α1j (rjB, F ) would exceed
1
2
in this case, which is a contradiction.
29Bear in mind that a bad rating riB issued by rating agency i (the most reputable agency) is enough
to generate a failure with probability β.
30The denominators of the probabilities of success and failure cancel out and are therefore ignored.
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In addition, note that
∂(γj−γj)
∂(γsi−γsi )
< 0. Since dΨnc
d(γsi−γsi )
= dΨc
d(γsi−γsi )
= −1
2
(1− α0) < 0 and
dα1j(rjB ,F)
d(γsi−γsi )
=
θβ(1−α0)
1
4
(1−γj+γj)
(1−θ+ 1
2
((1−θ)+θβ(1−α0) 12Φ(riB))(1−γj+γj))
2 > 0, the derivative of expression
(16) with respect to γsi − γ
s
i is equal to:
−(1− β)
1
2
(1− α0) θ
(
α1j (rjG, S)−
1
2
)
−((1− β)Ψncθ +Ψc (1− θ))

dα1j (rjB, F )
d
(
γsi − γ
s
i
)


+
1
2
(1− α0) (1− θ + θβ)
(
α1j (rjB, F )−
1
2
)
< 0.
This is negative because for a mixed strategies equilibrium, expression (16) is equal to
zero which implies that:
(1− β)
1
2
(1− α0) θ
(
α1j (rjG, S)−
1
2
)
>
1
2
(1− α0) (1− θ + θβ)
(
α1j (rjB, F )−
1
2
)
.
To sum up, the derivatives of expression (16) with respect to γsi − γ
s
i and γj − γj are
negative and by implicit differentiation
∂(γj−γj)
∂(γsi−γsi )
< 0.
B.2.3. The Equilibrium Behavior of Rating Agency i
An L rating agency i chooses the rating by looking at (10) (or (9)). From the comparison
with expression (15), it is clear that the incentives to issue riG are now higher than in
the single rating case even if ΥG = 1 and ΥB = 1. From the problem of rating agency j,
Pr (rjB) > 0
31 and max
{
α1j (rjB, F ) ,
1
2
}
> 1/2 in equilibrium. Hence, the reward for
a correct (or unverifiable) bad rating issued by i decreases for sure in equilibrium even
if max
{
α1j (rjG, F ) ,
1
2
}
= 1/2. This means that in equilibrium γsi − γ
s
i > γi − γi.
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31An L rating agency either issues a bad rating or plays a mixed strategy.
32If the second rating affects the probability of success of a project, β increases if the second rating is
bad and decreases if the second rating is good. In this case, α1i (riB , F ) depends on the second rating
that is issued but provided that the changes in β are moderate in both directions there is no reason
for the “average” value of α1i (riB , F ) to deviate much from the value used above. Since the second
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B.2.4. When ΠG = 1
There is an extra term in expression (16) equal to (βΨncθ +Ψc (1− θ))
(
α1j (rjG, F )−
1
2
)
.
Everything else constant, this increases the incentives of rating agency j to issue a good
rating, but it can be easily shown that an equilibrium in which γj = 1 and γj = 0 is
still ruled out because, as when ΠG = 0, the expression is negative for these values of
γj. Note that
∂(γj−γj)
∂(γsi−γsi )
< 0 as when ΠG = 0 because
dα1j(rjG,F)
d(γsi−γsi )
< 0.
C. Symmetry between a Good and Bad Rating
If a bad project succeeds following a good rating with probability β, Pr (S | ., a) =
Pr (G | ., a) + β Pr (B | ., a) and Pr (F | ., a) = (1− β) Pr (B | ., a) regardless of the pri-
vate signal if the rating is good and expression (13) becomes:
α1 (rG, S) =
α0θ
α0θ + (1− α0)
1
2
(θ + (1− θ) β)
(
1− γ + γ
) or α1 (rG, F ) = 0.
Everything else remains the same. In a monopoly it can be easily shown that the results
only differ relative to Appendix A.1.4. because γ = 0 and γ = 1 can no longer be an
equilibrium when θ = 1
2
. Instead, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. In the single
rating case, the new expression (15) differs from the new (14) (both calculated with the
new probabilities, α1 (rG, S) and α1 (rG, F ) as derived in this Appendix) by the term
1
2
(1− β) (1− 2θ). In equilibrium γi − γi > (<) γ − γ only if θ < (>)
1
2
and the rating
agency still chooses to contradict the prior belief more often than in a monopoly. In the
sequential ratings case, the new expression (10) can be compared to the new (15) and
the incentives to issue riG in order to deny the competitor the possibility to build up
rating agency needs to build up reputation it is reasonable to assume that this is the case.
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reputation remain higher than in the single rating case, as explained in Section 4.2.3.
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